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THE NEGLECTED HISTORY BEHIND
PREBLE V MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY:
LESSONS FROM THE "MAINE RULE" FOR
ADVERSE POSSESSION
Luke Meier*
Under the "Maine Rule" for adverse possession, only possessors who
have the requisite intent can perfect an adverse possession claim. The
Maine Rule has been consistently criticized The history behind the
adoption of the Maine Rule, however, and the purpose it was to serve,
have been ignored. This Article fills that void. This inquiry leads to
some surprising revelations about the Maine Rule. The Maine Rule
was originally adopted so as to distinguish priorMaine cases rejecting
adverse possession in mistaken boundary situations. The purpose
behind the Maine Rule, then, was to enable-rather than prohibitadverse possession. The history surroundingthe adoption of the Maine
Rule has contemporary value; this history powerfully demonstrates the
pitfalls of using a claimant's state of mind as part of an adverse
possession analysis.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Preble v. Maine Central Railroad Co.,' the Supreme Judicial

Court of Maine famously2 described its approach for measuring a
* Professor of Law, Baylor Law School.
1. 27 A. 149, 149 (Me. 1893).
2. The Preble case, decided in 1893, has been cited in ten law journals since 2010.
Shyarnkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common Law, 163
U. PA. L. REv. 1241, 1283 n.182 (2015); Lynn Foster & J. Cliff McKinney, II, Adverse Possession
and Boundary by Acquiescence in Arkansas: Some Suggestions for Reform, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REv. 199, 208 n.76 (2011); Jake Linford, Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor:
Productive Use and PropertyAcquisition, 63 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 703, 766 n.300 (2013); Bruce
A. McGlauflin, Some Confusing Things Happened... On the Way to Modernizing Maine'sAdverse
Possession Law, 25 ME. B.J. 38, 39 (2010); Luke Meier, A Contextual Approach to Claim of Right
in Adverse Possession Cases: On Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, Bad Faith, and Mistaken Boundaries,
19 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 47, 49 n.6 (2015); Scott Andrew Shepard, Adverse Possession, PrivateZoning Waiver and Desuetude: Abandonment and Recapture of Property and Liberty Interests, 44
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claimant's state of mind for adverse possession.3 This test would come
to be known as the "Maine Rule."4 Under the Maine Rule, a claimant
can only establish adverse possession if he possessed with the correct
state of mind, which was described in Preble as the intent "to claim the
ownership of land not embraced in his title."
The Maine Rule has been heavily criticized by both courts and
commentators.6 Despite this widespread criticism, almost no attention
has been given to the origins of the doctrine.7 Given the ubiquitous
disdain for the Maine Rule, it is surprising that the following question
remains unresolved: Why did the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
adopt this test in the first place? This Article answers that question.
This inquiry into the historical origins of the Maine Rule leads to
some surprising revelations. The Maine Rule, it turns out, was actually
the byproduct of a change of heart by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
as to whether possession based on a mistaken property boundary could
lead to a successful adverse possession claim. The court had previously
rejected adverse possession in this context.' The Maine Rule, however,
was an analytical retreat (a complicated one, for sure) from the court's
previous prohibition against adverse possession in mistaken boundary
cases.9 The Maine Rule was developed as a test that would enable
mistaken boundary claimants to win their adverse possession claim.

U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 557, 562 n.7 (2011); Matthew Sipe, Comment, JaggedEdges, 124 YALE L.J.
853, 859 n.17 (2014); James Charles Smith, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Law of Neighbors,
39 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 757,769 n.34 (2011); Caroleene Hardee, Note, This LandIs Your Land:
Tran v. Macha and the Hostile Intent Standardin Texas Adverse Possession Law, 64 BAYLOR L.

REV. 569, 571 n.19 (2012); Christopher H. Meredith, Note, Imputed Abandonment: A Fresh
Perspective on Adverse Possession and a Defense of the Objective Standard, 29 MiSS. C. L. REV.

257, 275 n.164 (2010).
3. Preble, 27 A. at 150 (describing the state of mind required for a successful adverse
possession claim).
4.

Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Casefor "Bad Faith"Adverse Possession, 100

Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1039 n.9 (2006) (using the term "Maine rule"); Linford, supra note 2, at 766
n.300 (same); Smith, supra note 2, at 769 n.34 (same); see also Kara L. Spencer, Court Clarifies

Applicability of Mistaken BeliefRule to Adverse Possession Suits, 47 S.C. L. REV. 146, 150 (1995)
(using the term "Preblerule"); Meredith, supra note 2, at 275 n.164 (using the term "Maine view").

5. Preble, 27 A. at 150.
6. See, e.g., JERRY L. ANDERSON & DANIEL B. BOGART, PROPERTY LAW: PRACTICE,
PROBLEMS, AND PERSPECTIVES 128 (2014) ("Because [the Maine Rule] seems to reward bad actors
over those who make an honest mistake, a 'shrinking minority of jurisdictions' continues to use
some version of this rule, and even Maine itself has reversed the rule by statute." (quoting Fennell,

supranote 4, at 1039 n.10)).
7. Bruce A. McGlauflin has written an excellent discussion of Maine's shifting terminology
in discussing adverse possession claims. See McGlauflin, supra note 2, at 40-43. The specific
history behind the adoption of the Maine Rule, however, has been ignored to this point.
8. Preble, 27 A. at 150.
9. McGlauflin, supranote 2, at 41-42.
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Rather than overruling its previous case law rejecting adverse possession
in mistaken boundary cases, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
distinguished this case law by introducing a new inquiry into the intent
of the mistaken boundary claimant.'o Under this new inquiry, an adverse
possessor-even one whose claim was based on a mistaken boundarycould win her adverse possession suit, provided she had the right intent.
Much of the modem criticism of the Maine Rule ignores the
historical development of the rule. For instance, one frequent critique of
the Maine Rule is that it rewards only those possessors who have "bad
faith."" According to this critique, unless a possessor knows that the
land he is possessing is owned by someone else, he can never form the
intent needed under the Maine Rule.12 Thus, the Maine Rule is said to
reward those who know that they are possessing land owned by another,
whereas it punishes, or at least prohibits the claims of, those possessors
who had legitimately-but mistakenly-believed that they were
possessing their own land. Courts and commentators have frequently
noted the seeming injustice of this aspect of the Maine Rule.1 3 But this
critique ignores the history behind the test and thus completely
misunderstands the Maine Rule. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
did not presume that only those with "bad faith" could satisfy the intent
analysis; rather, the intent analysis was specifically created as a

10. See id. at 42-43.
11. See Foster & McKinney, supra note 2, at 208, 210 ("As stated above, the 'Maine
Doctrine' denies successful adverse possession to the claimant who possesses property with
mistaken, or 'with good faith' intent.").
12. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 857 & n.28 (3d

ed. 2000) (stating that the Maine Rule precludes claims by those who have made an honest
mistake); Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1122, 1144 & n.69 (1985) (stating that the Maine Rule "requires a subjective belief that the

occupied property belongs to someone else"); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality
ofProperty, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1875 n. 120 (2007) (stating that the "Maine Doctrine"
requires "bad faith for adverse possession"); Shepard, supra note 2, at 562 n.7 (stating that the
Maine Rule, which "limit[s] adverse-possession claims to trespassers who always intended to

possess adversely," is "essentially a 'bad faith' requirement"); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy
Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2430 n.61 (2001) ("[T]he Maine doctrine may
come close to requiring bad faith.").
13. HERBERT HOvENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 73 (6th ed.
2005) ("The Maine rule penalized the honest, yet mistaken possession, but rewards the possessor
who knowingly claims what she knows is not hers."); Merle W. Loper, Ed Godfrey: The Justice, the
Person, and Some Cases on Property, 47 ME. L. REV. 295, 303 n.25 (1995) (stating that the Maine
Rule contributes to the perception that "the law is a ass" (quoting CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER

TWIST 569 (Macmillan Collector's Library 2016) (1838))); Judson T. Tucker, Adverse Possession in
Mistaken Boundary Cases, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 389, 401 (1991) ("Under the [Maine Rule], it
appears that only those claimants who harbor illicit intent are rewarded, while those who possess the
land innocently, as their own, are prejudiced.").
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mechanism by which to allow a good-faith, mistaken boundary claimant
to successfully establish adverse possession.
Similarly, the occasional critique of the Maine Rule as encouraging
litigants to lie about their intent is also off-target, 14 once the Maine Rule
is properly understood. At least as applied to mistaken boundary claims,
the Maine Rule did not technically require a claimant to lie about his
intent; instead, the Maine Rule required a claimant to speculate--during
litigation-about a question which he had never actually considered
before. This is fantasy, but it is not lying.
Understanding the historical development of the Maine Rule is
important for the scholars, judges, and lawyers that deal with adverse
possession law. Understanding this history does not immunize the Maine
Rule from criticism. A doctrine that requires a litigant to speculate about
a fantastical state of mind is ripe for criticism, and a few commentators
have deftly lodged this particular attack against the Maine Rule.'s
I join in this criticism of the Maine Rule; as I explain later in this
Article, an inquiry into a possessor's intent is both unnecessary and
potentially problematic. 16
Rather, understanding the historical development of the Maine Rule
facilitates some fundamental insights into adverse possession law. The
history of the Maine Rule vividly demonstrates the pitfalls of trying to
use a possessor's state of mind as an analytical tool to distinguish wheat
from chaff in adverse possession. Because adverse possession arises in
various different factual settings, an analysis of a claimant's state of
mind in one type of case-say, a mistaken boundary case-might
produce undesirable (and unintended) results in a different type of case.
In other words, permitting or denying an adverse possession claim based
on the possessor's state of mind will likely lead to doctrinal confusion,
particularly if courts are inclined to apply a uniform "rule" for all
different types of adverse possession cases.
The story of the Maine Rule is a story of the doctrinal confusion
(and confusion of tongues)" that can arise when courts inquire into a
claimant's state of mind as part of an adverse possession analysis.
Indeed, one might say that the Maine Rule represents a "doubling down"
on the inquiry into the claimant's state of mind. While previous Maine

14.

See, e.g., BARLOW BURKE & JOSEPH SNOE, PROPERTY: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS

&

86 (3d ed. 2008) (stating that the Maine approach "tempts the possessor . .. to lie"); HOVENKAMP
KURTZ, supra note 13, at 73 ("[T]his so-called 'Maine' rule creates a heavy incentive to commit
perjury . . . .").
15. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.

16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67.
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cases had considered only the claimant's knowledge, the Maine Rule
introduced an inquiry into the claimant's intent.
The end result was-as suggested above-a legal test that can only
be characterized as ludicrous and illusory. Indeed, the Maine Rule is so
convoluted that the Maine Legislature has twice enacted legislation to
attempt to overrule the approach." Even after two attempts, it is still
unclear as to whether the Maine Legislature has achieved its objective.
The very conditions that led to the creation of the Maine Rule,
however, still exist today. Without a clear understanding of how Maine
got to here from there-that is, without an understanding of the
historical. development of the doctrine-history is likely to repeat itself.
The objective of this Article is to avoid that result.
II.

KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT

The Maine Rule is typical in requiring an analysis of an adverse
possessor's state of mind; many jurisdictions require a claimant to have
the "right" state of mind in order to perfect an adverse possession
claim.19 The Maine Rule is unique, however, in that the inquiry into the
claimant's state of mind involves an analysis of the possessor's intent.20
Outside of the Maine Rule, the analysis of a claimant's state of mind will
focus on the knowledge?' of the possessor regarding true ownership of
the land being possessed.22

18. See infra text accompanying notes 160-71.
19. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 159 (8th ed. 2014) ("The requirement that adverse
possession be accompanied by [the right state of mind] is embodied in the statutes of various states,
and even when it is not, a considerable number of courts have read it in, whether in terms of claim
of title, claim of right, or hostility.").
20. Loper, supra note 13, at 302 (describing the "unique Maine doctrine" that requires a
possessor to prove the "intent to claim the land even if he had known that it was not his").
21. See Fennell, supra note 4, at 1051-52 (describing the different "knowledge" states of
mind, and noting that intent is "sometimes" also a part of the state of mind inquiry).
22. The state of mind required by a possessor-either knowledge or intent-is referred to
under a variety of "terms" and associated with different "elements" of adverse possession law. See,
e.g., ROGER BERNHARDT & ANN M. BURKHART, REAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 40-41 (6th ed.

2010) (using the term "hostile" to refer to the possessor's belief as to who is the true owner of the
land being possessed); DANIEL B. BOGART & JOHN MAKDISI, INSIDE PROPERTY LAW: WHAT

MATTERS AND WHY 23 (2009) ("In most jurisdictions, an adverse possessor must have a requisite
state of mind-often called a claim of right."); A. JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND TEXT ON
PROPERTY 126 (5th ed. 2004) (using the term "claim of right" to refer to the requirement that the
possessor have the right state of mind regarding who is the true owner of the land being possessed);
JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 116

(2009) (explaining that the possessor's state of mind can be analyzed under the "hostile," "adverse,"
or "claim of right" element); Amie N. Broder, Note, Comparing Apples to APPLs: Importing the
Doctrine of Adverse Possession in Real Property to PatentLaw, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 557, 595
(2007) ("Hostile possession ... speaks to the intent of the adverse possessor."). In some instances,
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Indeed, before the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine adopted the
intent-based Maine Rule, it had used the typical knowledge-based test as
part of its analysis in determining whether a successful adversepossession claim had been established.23 Problems associated with
the knowledge-based approach, however, compelled the Court to
incorporate the intent-based approach years later. Thus, to fully
understand the Maine Rule, it is necessary to understand the typical
knowledge-based approach to resolving adverse-possession claims,
including the problems that frequently arise in applying this test.24
The typical hombook description of the knowledge-based approach
is as follows: jurisdictions employ one of three approaches. 25 Under the
"good faith" approach, only those possessors who believed (incorrectly)
they were possessing their own land can establish an adverse possession
claim.2 6 Under the "bad faith" approach, only those possessors who
believed (correctly) that they were possessing land owned by another
party can establish an adverse possession claim.27 And, finally, under the
however, these very same terms will be used to refer to completely different concepts. PAULA A.
FRANZESE, A SHORT AND HAPPY GUIDE TO PROPERTY 78 (2011) ("Hostile[] mean[s] that the
possessor does not have the true owner's permission to be there."); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY
C. KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW: POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON GOOD 653 (2012)

(stating that the majority rule is that hostile simply means without permissions); JAMES CHARLES
SMITH, THE GLANNON GUIDE TO PROPERTY: LEARNING PROPERTY THROUGH MULTIPLE-CHOICE

QUESTIONS AND ANALYSIS 53 (3d ed. 2015) ("Possession is adverse only if it is without the
authority or permission of the true owner of the land."); Merrill, supra note 12, at 1142 (associating
the term "claim of right" with the question of whether the possessor had permission from the true
owner of the land). To avoid this confusion of tongues, I have intentionally avoided the use of these
terms and have resisted associating the concepts discussed in this Article to any particular element

of adverse possession law. For an example of the problems that can arise due to terminology
confusion, see infra note 163.

23. See Preble v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 27 A. 149, 150-51 (Me. 1893).
24. The problems associated with the knowledge-based approach have been more fully
explained in a previous article. See generally Meier, supra note 2. Readers wishing a more

extensive discussion of this topic should consult this paper.
25.

See, e.g., CALVIN MASSEY, PROPERTY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 84

(2012) (stating that there are three approaches to determining whether a claimant has satisfied the
claim of right requirement); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 198-99 (2007) (same); Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH.

U. L.Q. 739, 746 (1986) (same).
26. See Will Saxe, When "Comprehensive" Prescriptive Easements Overlap Adverse
Possession: Shifting Theories of "Use" and "Possession,"33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 175, 18081 (2006) (listing states that take a good faith approach to the claim of right requirement, which
requires the possessor to believe she owns the land being possessed). As Professor Fennell points

out, the knowledge-based approach is more than just an inquiry into the claimant's knowledge, but
instead "depends on the interaction between fact and belief." Fennell, supra note 4, at 1050. As
such, Professor Fennell suggests that the "good faith" and "bad faith" labels be replaced with

"knowing" and "inadvertent." See id. at 1057-59. I also prefer this terminology but have opted to
retain the "good faith" and "bad faith" terms simply because of their ubiquitous use.
27. COLLEEN E. MEDILL, ACING PROPERTY: A CHECKLIST APPROACH TO SOLVING PROPERTY
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"objective approach," a claimant's knowledge (or belief) regarding true
ownership of the land being possessed is irrelevant; 28 "good faith" and
"bad faith" possessors can both establish an adverse possession claim. 2 9
This is all simple enough. But, things become more difficult when
one considers that adverse possession claims arise in three different
factual settings.30 In the first, a "squatter" begins possessing someone
else's land with the knowledge that the land being possessed is owned
by someone else." The other two types of typical adverse possession
cases involve a claimant who honestly, but mistakenly, believes that the
land being possessed is actually owned by her. In a "color of title" case,
the claimant thought that she was the true owner because of a deed or
other written document that purported to make her so. 32 The problem,
PROBLEMS 358 (A. Benjamin Spencer ed., 2d ed. 2012) ("A few jurisdictions apply a 'bad faith'
subjective standard where the adverse possessor must believe that the land belongs to someone
else .... ); see Hardee, supra note 2, at 571-72 (suggesting that Texas might follow a "bad faith
standard, ... [which] requires a possessor to be aware of other claims of ownership"). For purposes
of this Article, I have ignored the interesting point made by Professor Fennell, which is that a
possessor might be uncertain as to true ownership of the land being possessed, thus complicating the

application of either the good faith or bad faith approach. See Fennell, supra note 4, at 1049-51
(explaining that possessors might often be unsure regarding true ownership of the disputed land).
28. See Carol Necole Brown & Serena M. Williams, Rethinking Adverse Possession: An
Essay on Ownership and Possession, 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 583, 590 (2010) (stating that the
objective approach to claim of right, known as the "Connecticut Rule," "has been adopted by a

majority of states").
29.

See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES

§ 6.1,

at 299 (5th ed. 2010) ("An objective test makes the adverse possessor's state of mind
irrelevant . . . .").
30. The three different types of adverse possession cases have been recognized by other
authors as well. R. H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A Response to ProfessorCunningham,

64 WASH. U. L.Q. 65, 89 (1986) (distinguishing between squatter cases and mistaken boundary
cases in support of the thesis that courts implicitly prefer possessors acting in good faith); Radin,

supra note 25, at 746-47, 747 n.21 (discussing the distinction between "color of title," "boundaries,"
and "squatters" as a potentially relevant distinction that was ignored in Professor Epstein's temporal

perspective on property law). It is possible that additional-or different- categories of adverse
possession cases could be recognized, but this Article focuses on these three basic types of fact
patterns.

31.

On occasion, the term "squatter" is defined slightly differently than how it is used herein.

See, e.g., Per C. Olson, Comment, Adverse Possession in Oregon: The Belief-in-Ownership

Requirement, 23 ENVTL. L. 1297, 1301-02 (1993) ("A squatter occupies property in recognition of
another's title with no intention of claiming title to it ....

). Most frequently, however, the term is

&

simply used to denote possession of land by one with knowledge that legal title is in another.
Halpern v. Lacy Inv. Corp., 3-9 S.E.2d 519, 521 (Ga. 1989) (defining "squatter" as a person who
"enter[s] upon the land without any honest claim of right to do so"); Eduardo Moisis Pefialver
Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1095, 1107-08 (2007) (using the term to
refer to a possessor who knows that he is not the title owner).

32.

"Color of title" is sometimes defined slightly differently than how it is defined herein.

Often, the existence of the document, rather than the subjective belief in the validity of that
document, will be emphasized. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 19, at 162 ("Color of
title . . . refers to a claim founded on a written instrument (a deed, a will) or a judgment or decree
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though, is that the deed-for whatever reason-is legally ineffective to
convey legal title.33 In a mistaken boundary case, the claimant is the true
owner of a piece of land, but is simply mistaken as to the precise
location of the boundary between her land (to which she is the true
owner) and that of her neighbors (to which she is not the true owner).
Understanding the three basic types of adverse possession cases
is-in isolation-simple enough. The difficulty arises, however, when
one considers how each of three different knowledge-based approaches
applies to each of the three types of adverse possession cases. These
results are depicted below:
TABLE 1
Type of Case

Result Under Result Under Result Under
Objective Good Faith Bad Faith
Approach

Approach

Approach

Win
Win
Win

Win
Lose
Win

Lose
Win
Lose

Color of Title
Squatter
Mistaken Boundary

Notice that a uniform objective approach results in an adverse
possessor being able to win all three different types of cases. But, the
good faith and bad faith approaches produce different results in the three
different types of adverse possession cases. Under a good faith approach,
the mistaken boundary claimant and the color of title claimant win while
the squatter loses. Under the bad faith approach, the squatter wins while
the mistaken boundary claimant and color of title claimant lose.
The results depicted in Table 1 reveal a major shortcoming of the
knowledge-based approach: a court might not like the results that a
"uniform" approach produces. For instance, a jurisdiction considering
the objective approach might like the result this test produces in the
that is for some reason defective and invalid (as when the grantor does not own the land conveyed
by deed or is incompetent to convey, or the deed is improperly executed)."); MASSEY, supra note
25, at 87 ("Color of title describes a claim that is based on a written transfer of title-a deed, will, or
court judgment-that happens to be defective and thus not valid."). Usually, however, the
statements suggesting that the mere existence of the defective document is alone sufficient to
qualify as color of title are made in situations in which the adverse-possession claimant did, in fact,
believe the defective document to be legally effective. JAMES CHARLES SMITH ET AL., PROPERTY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 185 (3d ed. 2013) ("Many courts, even in states that generally reject a good
faith requirement for adverse possession law, require subjective belief that the colorable title is
valid."); R. H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 337
(1983) ("'Color of title' is held to require a title the possessor honestly thinks to be a good title.").
33. See Price v. Tomrich Corp., 167 S.E.2d 766, 770 (N.C. 1969) ("Color of title is generally
defined as a written instrument which purports to convey the land described therein but fails to do
so because of a want of title in the grantor or some defect in the mode of conveyance.").
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color of title and mistaken boundary situation but object to a squatter
being able to perfect an adverse possession claim. Similarly, a
jurisdiction might like that a good faith approach allows a color of title
claimant to win while a squatter loses but object to the idea that a
mistaken boundary claimant wins under the good faith approach. And, a
jurisdiction might be inclined to employ the bad faith approach so as to
preclude a mistaken boundary claimant from perfecting an adverse
possession claim but object to the notion that a squatter wins under a bad
faith approach while a color of title claimant loses.
Because a jurisdiction might not like the results that a uniform
approach produces, there will be an inclination to "bend" or "tailor" the
knowledge-based inquiry to achieve the result that a jurisdiction prefers
for each type of adverse possession case. The failure to appreciate this
fact, I believe, has been the source of much confusion regarding the
knowledge-based approach. The infamous case of Van Valkenburgh v.
Lutz nicely demonstrates this point.3 4
The Van Valkenburgh case was unique in that it involved both a
squatter claim and mistaken boundary claim within the context of the
same litigation. The claimants in Van Valkenburgh had knowingly
squatted on the land of their neighbor by building structures on land to
which they knew they did not have legal title.35 In addition, the
claimants had also unknowingly possessed their neighbor's parcel by
building a garage, which mistakenly encroached across the boundary
line between the parcels.36 The claimants asserted adverse possession
based on their squatting activities and their mistaken boundary
encroachment; the New York court rejected both claims.3 7
With regard to the squatter claim in Van Valkenburgh, the court
used a good faith approach: because the claimants knew that the land
they were possessing was owned by someone else, they did not have the
right state of mind.3 1 With regard to the garage encroachment, however,
the court employed a bad faith approach: because the claimants thought
that the land being possessed was owned by them, they did not have the
right state of mind.3 9
The result in Van Valkenburgh-in which the court employed both
the good faith and bad faith approaches within the same case-can
appear illogical or contradictory. Indeed, Van Valkenburgh has been a
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

106 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1952).
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 29-30.
Id.
Id. at 30.
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popular target of commentators. 4 0 But the result is perfectly sensible if
one starts with the proposition that the court simply did not believe that
adverse possession should be available in either the squatter or mistaken
boundary situation.4 1 This is definitely a defensible perspective on
adverse possession.42 If one assumes that this is the end game a court
wants for each of these types of cases, however, notice that a uniform
approach to the knowledge-based test will not produce the desired result
for each of these two types of adverse possession cases. Under the good
faith or objective approach, the mistaken boundary wins; 43 under the bad
faith approach, the squatter wins."
As Van Valkenburgh demonstrates, a uniform approach to
measuring whether an adverse possession claimant has the required state
of mind may produce undesirable results. Recognizing this limitation of
the knowledge-based approach is important to understanding the
development of the Maine Rule. It is my contention that the intent-based
approach was introduced by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in
part, to avoid the very criticisms that have been launched against the Van
Valkenburgh decision. The Maine Rule was thought to avoid the
necessity of having to use a different "test" in order to reach the
"correct" decision in each type of adverse possession case.45
Before proceeding to the development of the Maine Rule, it is
worth noting one final point about the knowledge-based approach.
Often, commentators, judges, and students will question why a

40. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SERKIN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 61 (2013) (describing the
decision as relying upon "two internally contradictory holdings"); JAMES WINOKUR ET AL.,
PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 180 (2002) (citing Van Valkenburgh as an example of "the confusion

to which some courts have fallen prey" in considering the claim of right analysis within adverse
possession law); Todd Barnet, The Uniform Registered State Land and Adverse Possession Reform
Act, A Proposalfor Reform of the United States Real Property Law, 12 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 46

n.143 (2004) (describing Van Valkenburgh as an "odd case"); Roger Bernhardt, Essay, Teaching
Real PropertyLaw as Real Estate Lawyering, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1099, 1t18 n.67 (1996) (stating that
Van Valkenburgh is a "good case to avoid" in teaching adverse possession to students); Lila
Perelson, Note, New York Adverse Possession Law as a Conspiracy of Forgetting: Van

Valkenburgh v. Lutz and the Examination of Intent, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1089, 1089, 1109, 1117
(1993) (describing the Van Valkenburgh opinion as creating "a major contradiction in the
requirement .. . as to the intent required of the possessor in taking possession," calling the result

"absurd" and for the case to be overruled).
41. And that this result (denying both types of adverse possession claims) must be achieved
by focusing on the claimant's state of mind.

42.

Under this perspective, adverse possession would only be available in the color of title

scenano.

43. See supraTable 1.
44.

See supraTable 1.

45. See Foster & McKinney, supra note 2, at 210.
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46
jurisdiction would ever employ the bad faith approach. The results
depicted in Table 1, however, resolve this mystery: the bad faith
approach is the only knowledge-based test that results in a loss for the
mistaken boundary claimant.47 There are differences of opinion as to
whether a mistaken boundary claimant should be able to perfect adverse
possession. I take no position on this normative question, except to state
that the argument against adverse possession in this context is definitely
defensible. 48 For a court committed to denying adverse possession in a
mistaken boundary context, 49 however, the bad faith approach is the
only knowledge-based test that produces the desired result. Appreciating
this point, I believe, resolves the question as to why a jurisdiction would
ever employ the bad faith approach: it is the only knowledge-based
test that permits a court to deny adverse possession in a mistaken
boundary situation.

III.

EXPLAINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "MAINE RULE"

The analysis developed in Part II of this Article provides a
necessary foundation to understanding the development of the "Maine
Rule." The Maine Rule involved a warping of the knowledge-based bad
faith approach. Under this mutation of the bad faith inquiry, the critical
question is not the possessor's belief regarding true ownership of the
land involved, but rather an inquiry into the intent of the possessor in
possessing the land in question. As explained below, this shift in focus
from belief to intent constituted an effort by Maine courts to develop an
uniform analysis that permitted adverse possession in both a mistaken
boundary case (despite early cases using a bad faith approach precluding
this result) and a squatter case.

46.
47.

See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
See supra Table 1.

48. The bad faith approach to claim of right in mistaken boundary cases, so as to deny the
adverse possession claim, is definitely sensible and supportable. There are ample policy reasons as
to why a court might want to prevent a mistaken boundary case from ripening into an adverse
possession claim. Denying adverse possession in these cases provides an incentive on a landowner

to ascertain the true, legal boundary separating his lot from his neighbor's. If a possessor is not
allowed to profit from a mistake, there is less incentive to make this "mistake," particularly if the
trespassing possessor must remove (and rebuild) any encroaching enclosures. Moreover, denying

adverse possession in mistaken boundary cases facilitates the goal of cementing record, legal title;
recognizing adverse possession ejects additional uncertainty into this process.
49. And, assuming that a court feels compelled to achieve this result by looking at the
possessor's state of mind rather than another element, such as the notoriety element. See, e.g.,

Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 262-64 (N.J. 1969) (rejecting an adverse possession claim based
on a mistaken boundary by concluding that the possession was notorious).
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Early Maine Case Law: Bad FaithApproach in Mistaken
Boundary Cases

With regard to mistaken boundary disputes, the first Maine cases
clearly took a straightforward bad faith approach so as to preclude
adverse possession. The first Maine case to address the question is the
182450 case of Brown v. Gay." Brown involves the typical mistaken
boundary case in which a party has erected an enclosure, thinking that he
was enclosing his lot, but instead enclosing some of his neighbor's lot. 52
In Brown, the party who had erected the enclosure claimed adverse
possession of the land that he had enclosed and possessed. 53 The court
denied the possessor's claim under the following reasoning: "[The
possessor's] claim is plainly founded in mistake. If the owner of a parcel
of land, through inadvertency or ignorance of the dividing line, includes
a part of an adjoining tract within his enclosure, this does not operate
a disseisin .

. ..

It is clear in Brown that the court is denying the possessor's claim
because of the possessor's state of mind. Nothing about the adequacy or
nature of the actual possession is ever mentioned as a reason to deny the
adverse possession claim. Rather, the possessor's mistaken belief that he
owned the enclosed land is the problem identified by the court in
denying the claim.
In denying the claim in Brown, the Maine court employed the bad
faith version of the knowledge-based approach. The possessor thought
that he owned the land in question. The possessor's good faith belief was
not, however, the state of mind required by the court.55 Recall that a bad
faith approach is the only approach that results in a mistaken boundary

50. Maine did not become a state until 1820, as part of the Missouri Compromise; Maine was
carved out of the existing state of Massachusetts. See Jenny B. Wahl, Stay East, Young Man?
Market Repercussions of the Dred Scott Decision, 82 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 361, 362 (2007)
(explaining the history of Maine statehood). Although, some early Maine decisions relied upon
Massachusetts case law as authority, see, for example, Steams v. Burnham, 5 Me. 261, 263 (1828)
(citing and relying upon Massachusetts cases), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine clearly felt free
to chart its own path on legal issues. This is what occurred in the mistaken boundary cases. These
early Maine cases involving mistaken boundaries are decided with scant reference to existing case
law. Indeed, the initial decision in Brown v. Gay, in which the bad faith approach to claim of right is
adopted for mistaken boundary cases, is without citation to any precedent. 3 Me. 126, 130 (1824).
For this reason, I have chosen to begin my analysis with the earliest Maine case law, rather than
examining earlier Massachusetts case law.
51. 3 Me. 126.
52. Id. at 128-29.
53. Id. at 130-3 1.
54. Id.
55. Id
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claimant losing an adverse possession claim.56 In Brown, the court
obviously believed that adverse possession should not be available in
this type of case; to reach this result, the court employed a bad faith
approach to claim of right.
The bad faith approach employed in Brown was cited in subsequent
mistaken boundary cases decided by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
in the decades following the Brown decision.57 Soon after adopting a bad
faith approach so as to deny adverse possession in mistaken boundary
cases, however, it became apparent that Maine would not employ this
same approach in color of title cases. Recall that a uniform bad faith
approach produces the following results:
TABLE 2
Type of Case

Result Under
Bad FaithApproach

Color of Title
Squatter
Mistaken Boundary

Lose
Win
Lose

A party with color of title cannot win under a bad faith approach
because that party honestly believes, based on a faulty deed, that they are
the true owner of the land in question. Thus, the approach employed by
Maine in the mistaken boundary case of Brown would result in a
rejection of the adverse possession claim of somebody with color of title.
This has never been the law in Maine, however. As early as 1822, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated:
[W]here the person claiming title, by a deed duly registered, has
entered into possession of the land under his deed, and continued
openly to occupy and improve it.

.

., though the deed may not convey

the legal estate, still the possession of a part of the land described in
it ...

may be considered as a possession of the whole and as a disseisin

of the true owner . .

58

That a color of title claimant can win an adverse possession case
has been repeatedly affirmed under Maine law. 59 By definition, a color
56. See supraTable 1.
57. See, e.g., Ross v. Gould, 5 Me. 204, 212 (1828) ("A disseisin cannot be committed by
mistake. . . ." (citing Brown, 3 Me. at 130-31)).
58. Little v. Megquier, 2 Me. 176, 178 (1822).
59. See, e.g., John Wallingford Fruit House Inc. v. MacPherson, 386 A.2d 332, 334 (Me.
1978) (acknowledging that a color of title claimant can win an adverse possession case);
Homblower v. Banton, 69 A. 568, 569 (Me. 1907) (same); Brackett v. Persons Unknown, 53 Me.
228, 231-32 (1861) (affirming lower court decision finding adverse possession by possessor with
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of title claimant believes that he is the true owner of the land in
question,o and thus, the result that a color of title claimant can win an
adverse possession claim cannot be squared with the bad faith approach
used in early mistaken boundary cases. The color of title claimant can
win only under a good faith or objective approach.61 Therefore, the bad
faith approach was employed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court to
get the "right" result for Maine in its early mistaken boundary cases, but
this same approach was obviously not employed in color of title cases.
What about Maine's approach in squatter cases? Although there are
relatively few cases on point, Maine squatters have tended to fare pretty
well in asserting adverse possession claims. A few old cases recognize
the adverse possession claims of squatters.6 2 This result is not
necessarily surprising, given that squatters were generally treated
favorably during the nineteenth century.6 3 Moreover, absentee land
ownership in Maine might have been enough of a concern to favor
squatters, so as to get land into production.' More surprising, however,
is that Maine has continued to recognize the adverse possession claims
of squatters in more recent cases. For instance, in the recent case of
Northland Realty, LLC v. Crawford,65 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine rejected the argument that an adverse possessor's claim was

color of title). Indeed, by statute, color of title is required for adverse possession of "uncultivated

lands." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
60.

§ 816 (1980).

As explained earlier, this Article uses the term "color of title" only to refer to those

situations in which the possessor has a good faith belief that the document conveys valid title. In
one decision, Maine deviated from this definition, holding that a party had color of title, as required
under the statute governing adverse possession of uncultivated lands, even though that party knew
the deed in question could not transfer legal title. See Estate of Stone v. Hanson, 621 A.2d 852,

853-54 (Me. 1993) (determining that the Maine legislature did not intend to incorporate a good faith
requirement in limiting adverse possession of uncultivated lands to those with color of title, thus
allowing possessor who had created and filed a deed to himself, to win an adverse possession

claim.). Under the terminology employed in this Article, a possessor who knows that her deed is
without effect is a squatter. That said, Maine does clearly adhere to the distinction employed in this
Article between color of title claimants and mistaken boundary claimants. See John Wallingford

FruitHouse Inc., 386 A.2d at 334 (stating that a mistake as to the land described in a deed does not
constitute color of title).
61. See supraTable 1.
62. See Penobscot Dev. Co. v. Scott, 157 A. 311, 312, 314 (Me. 1931) (recognizing the
adverse possession claim of a squatter); Bean v. Bachelder, 74 Me. 202, 205-06 (1882) (same).
63. Squatters played a big part of the westward settlement of America in the nineteenth
century. See Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution

in PropertyLaw, 55 MCGILL L.J. 47, 61 (2010) (Can.) ("There was a time, particularly when the
West was being settled, when it was seen as socially beneficial to encourage land-hungry locals to
take over from absentee paper title holders."). Squatting on federally owned land was encouraged

by various policies. See id.
64. See id. at 61 & n.57.
65. 953 A.2d 359 (Me. 2008).
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invalid because the possessor knew that record title was in another
party.66 Similarly, in Estate of Stone v. Hanson,6 the court refused to
require "an element of good faith" in the adverse possession claim of a
party who knew record title was in somebody else.68
If it is assumed that squatters can win under Maine law (and
applying the early Maine position that mistaken boundary claimants
could not win), Maine's desired result for each of three types of adverse
possession cases is depicted below:
TABLE 3
Type of Case

DesiredResult

Color of Title
Squatter
Mistaken Boundary

Win
Win
Lose

This result cannot be achieved under a uniform approach to claim
of right, however, as depicted in Table 4. In Table 4, the result in each
type of adverse possession case is depicted for each of the three
knowledge-based tests for a possessor's state of mind; when the result
under a particular test matches the result seemingly desired under early
Maine law, it is indicated with a checkmark:
TABLE 4
Type of Case

Color of Title
Squatter
Mistaken Boundary

Desire

Result Under Result Under Result Under
Objective
Good Faith BadFaith
Approach
Approach
Approach

Win
Win
Lose

Win
Win]
Win

Win]
Lose
Win

Lose
Win]
Lose'

66. Id. at 365 ("The fact that Mr. Crawford knew that Babb held record title and, at one point,
asked Babb for a right of first refusal, does not compel a finding that the Crawfords believed their
possession was subordinate to Babb's.").
67. 621 A.2d 852 (Me. 1993).
68. Id. at 852 n.1, 853-54 (refusing to read a requirement of good faith under specific statute
controlling adverse possession of uncultivated land "situated in any place incorporated for any
purpose" (quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 816 (1980))). The relationship between Maine
statutes addressing adverse possession, and the common law of adverse possession, has generated
some confusion, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recently stated that "there is only one
[adverse possession] claim-the common law claim . . . ." Dombkowski v. Ferland, 893 A.2d 599,
604 (Me. 2006). That said, the Dombkowski Court acknowledged that the Maine legislature has
attempted to amend Maine's common law claim for adverse possession. See id. at 604. This
legislative effort is discussed later in this Article. See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
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Because Maine (at least initially) wanted a mistaken boundary
claimant to lose, the bad faith approach was necessary in that type of
case. Although the bad faith approach is not necessary to achieve the
"right" result of a squatter winning an adverse possession claim (this
result could also be achieved under an objective approach), the bad faith
approach also produces the desired result in the squatter case. The
importance of this observation is explained below.
B.

Modern Maine Case Law: PermittingMistaken Boundary
Claimants to Win

To continue the study of Maine adverse possession law, and to fully
understand the Maine Rule, it is necessary to consider how Maine's
approach in mistaken boundary cases has changed over time. This is a
complicated inquiry. As indicated above, a Maine statute now (arguably)
allows mistaken boundary claimants to win an adverse possession case.6 9
Before the statute attempted to achieve this result, however, Maine cases
had already moved away from the early view that a mistaken boundary
case could not ripen into an adverse possession claim. The manner in
which this result was achieved, however, was the introduction of an
intent-based approach to measuring a possessor's state of mind.
To appreciate what occurred in Maine, the discussion from the
previous Subpart is important: because Maine was seemingly committed
to the view that squatters should win, the court was reluctant to achieve
the result of allowing mistaken boundary claimants to win by simply
rejecting the previous case law adopting a bad faith approach.70 Instead,
the court attempted to introduce an additional, distinguishing inquiry that
examined the possessor's state of mind not just with regard to the belief
of the possessor as to who was the true owner, but the intent of the
possessor with regard to the land in question." Unfortunately, this
additional inquiry made absolutely no sense in the context of a mistaken
boundary case, because it required a fact finder to determine the
possessor's hypothetical intent to a question that the mistaken boundary
possessor had never considered: "If you had known that you did not own
the land in question, what would have been your intent with regard to
your possession?" This nonsensical inquiry-although it served the
technical purpose of distinguishing the prior Maine case law in boundary
disputes, while preserving Maine's desired result in squatter casesproduced widespread confusion.
69.
70.

See infra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.

71.

See infra text accompanying notes 143-48.
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1. The Moody and Otis Cases: A Sign of Things to Come
The move away from the early Maine position that mistaken
boundary claimants cannot win first starts to appear in the 1839 case of
Moody v. Nichols.72 The Moody case involved a dispute regarding the
location of the western boundary of a lot that had been carved out of a
larger lot (owned by Chandler) and then sold to Moody.73 The western
boundary of Moody's lot (and the eastern boundary of Chandler's
remaining land) had been marked by a surveyor and agreed to by both
Chandler and Moody.74 Thereafter, Moody erected a brush fence on the
agreed-upon boundary.75 Decades later, a dispute arose when Chandler
conveyed his land to a third party, who in turn conveyed the land to
Nichols.76 It was discovered that the brush fence had erroneously been
placed to the west of the true boundary, meaning that Moody had been in
possession of a portion of the Chandler-Nichols tract.7 7
The case was litigated to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, with
Moody asserting a claim of adverse possession.78 Under the bad faith
approach to mistaken boundary cases, which Maine had previously
adopted in Brown v. Gay, Moody's claim was invalid. As previously
stated in Brown, "[i]f the owner of a parcel of land, through inadvertency
or ignorance of the dividing line, includes a part of an adjoining tract
within his enclosure, this does not operate a disseisin."79 Indeed,
Nichols's attorney relied upon and cited the Brown decision in arguing
against Moody's adverse possession claim.so Moreover, Moody himself
had seemed to facilitate the easy application of the Brown approach by
declaring that, if the brush fence did not constitute the true western
boundary of his lot, it was because of a simple mistake."
Despite the Brown precedent holding that a mistake about a
boundary line cannot ripen into an adverse possession claim, and despite
Moody's declaration that the location of the brush fence to the west of
his true lot line was a mistake, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
nevertheless upheld the jury verdict in favor of Moody.82 In an approach
that would be repeated in later cases, however, the court did not
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

16 Me. 23 (1839).
Id. at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 25.
Brown v. Gay, 3 Me. 126, 130-31 (1824).
Moody, 16 Me. at 24.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26-27.
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explicitly overrule Brown. Instead, the court distinguished the previous
decision by noting that Moody and Chandler had agreed upon the
(mistaken) location of the boundary line:
[T]he parties may agree upon a line of boundary, and when they
have so agreed, and the possession is in accordance with it, such
boundary after an acquiescence for so long a time, as to give title by
disseizin, will not be disturbed, although found to have been
erroneously established .. ...

The acquiescence theory used in Moody can, technically speaking,
be considered a distinct legal theory from adverse possession. An
acquiescence theory focuses on the true owner's state of mind and
conduct.8 4 Under the acquiescence rule used in Moody, the true owner's
mistaken agreement that a physical line represented the actual, legal
line resulted in the title to that land being lost in favor of the party in
actual possession."
Even though the Moody case involved the distinct legal theory of
acquiescence, the Moody Court's use of this theory to award title to the
mistaken possessor can be seen as a partial retreat from the Brown
holding. In Brown, the court clearly and emphatically rejected the notion
that a possessor who was mistaken about the location of a boundary
could ever acquire good title to that land based on that possession. 6 In
Moody, the court qualified that result, holding that, if the true owner
were also mistaken and had agreed to the boundary, the mistaken
possessor could acquire good title." This limitation on Brown could not
have been anticipated from the Brown opinion itself: In Brown, the
court's rejection of adverse possession (in mistaken boundary cases) had
been unqualified."

83.

Id. at 25.

84.

James H. Backman, The Law of PracticalLocation of Boundaries and the Need for an

Adverse Possession Remedy,

1986 BYU L. REv. 957, 965-67 (1986) (explaining that the

acquiescence theory requires both parties to acquiesce in the line as a boundary).

85. Ironically, although Maine still recognizes the distinct legal concept of acquiescence, the
contemporary version of the doctrine would not apply in a case such as Moody's in which both the
possessor and the true owner were mutually mistaken as to the true location of a boundary. Under

modem Maine law, acquiescence is not applicable when both parties "were mutually mistaken as to
the boundary line." Hamlin v. Niedner, 955 A.2d 251, 254 (Me. 2008).
86. Brown v. Gay, 3 Me. 126, 130-31 (1824).
87. Moody, 16 Me. at 25.
88. Indeed, the distinction between an owner's agreement or "acquiescence" in a mistaken
boundary, as opposed to simply failing to bring suit to eject the possessor during the statutory time

period for adverse possession, is a slippery one.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine's retreat from the bad faith
approach in mistaken boundary cases continued in the 1841 case of Otis
v. Moulton.89 The Otis case involves a somewhat complicated fact
pattern that has elements of both a mistaken boundary case and a color
of title case. In Otis, both the true owner and the possessor had deeds
that purported to convey the land in question." The possessor's deed,
however, descended from a party that had been mistaken about the
boundaries of an original land grant from the state.9 1 The possessor,
having a deed that purported to make the possessor the true owner of the
land in question, sought to use the doctrine of adverse possession against
the true owner of the land. 92
The Otis case represents a slight deviation from the typical
mistaken boundary case, in that both parties in Otis had a deed that
described the land being disputed. In this sense, Otis is like a color of
title case: The possessor was relying upon a deed that purported to make
him the true owner but was ineffective to do so.93 That said, the case is
also a mistaken boundary case: The reason that the possessor's deed was
ineffective was because the possessor's remote grantor had been
mistaken as to the boundary limits of his land grant.94 In Otis, then, the
boundary mistake had occurred all the way up the chain of title-in the
initial land grant by the state-rather than in the actual deed of the
possessing party asserting an adverse possession claim.95
Despite the somewhat unique facts in Otis, the broad rule
announced previously in Brown could seemingly have precluded the
ripening of an adverse possession claim. The possessor's claim in Otis,
like the possessor's claim in Brown, was based upon a good-faith
mistake as to the location of a boundary dispute. The true owner in
Otis at least thought that Brown applied to preclude the possessor's
claim, as Brown was cited by the true owner in arguing before the Maine
high court.96
As in Moody two years previously, however, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court distinguished Brown in recognizing the adverse
possession claim of the possessor. The court conceded that the Brown
rule would have prevented an adverse possession claim of the original

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

20 Me. 205 (1841).
Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 212.
Id.
See id. at 207-11.
Id. at 207-12.
Id. at 207.
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party who had mistaken the boundaries of the state's land grant, but
thought that it was unfair to apply this rule to a subsequent grantee who
had acquired this defective deed down the chain of title:

.

The deeds of conveyance, it is true, described the land as situated in
the town of Bucksport and the proprietors of the township, and their
representatives might be supposed to intend to keep within their own
limits, and if they did not, the rule might justly be applied to them,
while professing to do so, that mistake does not give right. But the
grantee should not be expected to be familiar with the rights of the
proprietors and the bounds of their township ...

Concededly, the Otis fact pattern is a somewhat unique fact pattern
that does not, strictly speaking, directly contradict the holding in Brown.
The spirit of the Otis decision, however, particularly when coupled with
the Moody decision, seems to run against Brown. The Brown opinion
broadly pronounced that adverse possession was never available in cases
of mistaken boundaries." The court in Moody provided this qualifier:
except when the true owner is also mistaken and has agreed to the
boundary. 99 The Otis decision provided a further qualifier: except when
the boundary mistake has occurred up the chain of title."'o
2. Abbott and Preble: Permitting Mistaken Boundary Claimants to
Win by Considering Intent
After the Moody and Otis decisions, the tactic of detracting from
the Brown rule (that mistakes about the location of a boundary cannot
ripen into adverse possession), while nevertheless refusing to officially
overrule the Brown case, continued in a series of cases decided by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in the last half of the nineteenth
century. This line of cases, however, represented a more pronounced and
dramatic departure from Brown, even though the rule from Brown
continued to be cited as good law.
The first hint of this more dramatic retreat from Brown comes in the
short, and seemingly innocuous, opinion by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine in the 1850 case of Lincoln v. Edgecomb.or In Lincoln, the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the jury instructions given by

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 211-12.
Brown v. Gay, 3 Me. 126, 130-31 (1824).
Moody v. Nichols, 16 Me. 23, 25 (1839).
Otis, 20 Me. at 211-12.
31 Me. 345 (1850).
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a trial judge in a case in which a fence had been erected (and possession
had occurred) across the true lot line.'02 The jury instructions delineated
between an encroaching fence that had been located by a mistake and
one that had not been located by mistake."o' The fence located by
mistake, the trial court instructed (consistent with Brown), could not
ripen into adverse possession; if the fence had not been located by
mistake, however, adverse possession could occur.'0
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial judge's
instructions. 0 5 As described in the previous Subpart, the instructions
were an accurate reflection of Maine law at that time. In a mistaken
boundary case, under Brown, a possessor could not win because Maine
employed a bad faith approach to claim of right.o6 On the other hand, a
possessor that knowingly possesses across a boundary line is a squatter.
And, as described in the previous Subpart, squatters could win under
Maine law,1 07 a result that is also consistent with a bad faith approach to
claim of right.
Despite the consistency of the trial court's instructions with existing
Maine law, the seeds of the eventual transformation that was to follow
were planted in Lincoln. In Lincoln, neither the trial court nor the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court drew the distinction as simply one between
mistake and non-mistake, as I have done in the previous two paragraphs.
Instead, the distinction is drawn in language that is somewhat more
amorphous. The trial court's instructions delineated between adverse
possession cases involving a "mistake" and those in which "the tenant
claimed title up to the fence." 0 s In the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine,
the distinction is between a fence erected "by mistake" and a fence
erected "under a claim of title." 09
Whether the Lincoln Court actually intended to make a distinction
other than the distinction between an honest mistake and an intentional
encroachment is not necessarily clear from the short opinion delivered
by the court in that case. It is entirely possible that the Lincoln Court was
attempting to delineate between mistaken encroachments and intentional
encroachments and simply used the phrase "under a claim of title" as

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 345.
Id.
Id
Id.
See supraTable 1.

107.

See supratext accompanying notes 62-68.

108. Lincoln, 31 Me. at 345.
109. Id
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part of this distinction. This interpretation of the Lincoln language is
depicted directly below:
FIGURE 1
Encroachment
Honest Mistake

Intentional (Squatter)
or
"Under a Claim of Title"

If this is the distinction intended by the Lincoln Court, it did not
represent a departure from existing law.
The distinction drawn in Lincoln, however, eventually came to
represent something drastically different. Just four years later, in the
1863 case of Abbott v. Abbott,110 the language used in Lincoln
was picked up by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. In Abbott,
the court used the language from Lincoln to refer to something
entirely different than simply the difference between mistaken and
intentional encroachments.
The Abbott case involves a typical boundary dispute arising from a
fence (and subsequent possession) encroaching over the true lot line."'
In describing the Maine law applicable to such cases, however, the
Abbott Court distinguished between mistaken boundary cases involving
an "intention to claim title" and mistaken boundary cases in which there
is no "intention to claim title":
Mere occupation, by inadvertence, or mistake, without any intention to
claim title, may not be a disseizin; as where a fence is erroneously
erected not on the dividing line. But if, in such case, there is an
intention to claim title to the land occupied, though the line is fixed by
mistake, it is a disseizin. 112
After making this distinction, the Abbott Court attempted to
describe what it meant by an "intention to claim title."l 3 A more
thorough and helpful explanation of the distinction the Abbott Court was
making, however, came decades later in the oft-cited case of Preble v.

110. 51 Me. 575 (1863).
111. Id at 579.
112. Id. at 584 (citations omitted).
113. Id
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Maine Central Railroad Co.114 In Preble, the court explained what it
meant to have an "intention to claim title":
It must be an intention to claim title to all land within a certain
boundary on the face of the earth, whether it shall eventually be found
to be the correct one or not. If, for instance, one in ignorance of his
actual boundaries takes and holds possession by mistake up to a certain
fence beyond his limits, upon the claim and in the belief that it is the
true line, with the intention to claim title, and thus, if necessary, to
acquire "title be possession" up to that fence, such possession, having
the requisite duration and continuity, will ripen into title....
If, on the other hand, a party through ignorance, inadvertence, or
mistake occupies up to a given fence beyond his actual boundary,
because he believes it to be the true line, but has no intention to claim
title to that extent if it should be ascertained that the fence was on his
neighbor's land, an indispensable element of adverse possession is
wanting. In such a case the intent to claim title exists only upon the
condition that the fence is on the true line. The intention is not
absolute, but provisional, and the possession is not adverse. 115
As made evident in Preble, the necessary "intent to claim title" first
referenced by the court in Lincoln is an intent to use adverse possession
against the true owner when, and if, the true owner were ever to attempt
to remove the possessor from the owner's property.116 This intent is to be
distinguished from the "condition[al]" or "provisional" intent referenced
in Preble.117 Under this "provisional" intent, the possessor does not seek
to use adverse possession against the true owner but rather has retained
possession only until the time the true owner makes an appearance.
The Preble explanation assumes that the "intent to claim title"
mindset can distinguish between different types of mistaken boundary
claimants. In distinguishing a possessor who has the "intent to claim
title" mindset from a possessor who does not, the court says that both
possessions can be based on a "mistake.""' In other words, according to
Abbott and Preble, and contrary to what was suggested in Brown, a
mistake about the location of a boundary can ripen into adverse

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

27 A. 149 (Me. 1893).
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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possession, provided that the mistaken possessor has the right intent."'
The distinction made in Abbott and Preble can be depicted as follows:
FIGURE 2
Encroachment
Knowledge: Honest Mistake
Intent:

Intentiona (Squatter)

Intent to Claim Title
(Win AP Claim)

Conditional
or
Provisional Intent
(Lose AP Claim)

Intent, rather than knowledge, appeared to be the determining factor
after Abbott and Preble.
If the determining factor after Abbott and Preble is the intent to use
adverse possession to claim title, as opposed to a conditional intent in
which the possessor only wishes to remain in possession until the true
owner shows up, it is helpful to consider how this inquiry applies to a
squatter case, as depicted below:
FIGURE 3
Encroachment
Knowledge: Honest Mistake

Intentional (Squatter)

Intent: Intent to Claim Title Conditional Intent to Claim Title Conditional
(Win AP Claim)
or
(Win AP Claim)
or
Provisional
Provisional
(Lose AP Claim)
(Lose AP Claim)
In most cases, presumably, a squatter will have taken possession of
somebody else's land with the "intent to claim title." That is, the
squatter, having begun possession of land that he or she knows belongs
to somebody else, will hope to continue with the possession for a long
119. Other Maine Supreme Judicial Court cases make clear that, after Abbott, a mistake about
the location of a boundary can ripen into adverse possession, provided that the right intent is
present. See, e.g., Richardson v. Watts, 48 A. 180, 184-85 (Me. 1901) ("[T]hough there may have
been a mistake as to the true line, we think that the evidence shows that what they intended to claim,
and did claim, was the title as far as to the shore. If that was what they intended to claim, the
mistake in the line is unimportant."); Ricker v. Hibbard, 73 Me. 105, 107 (1881) ("The intention is
the test and not the mistake. It is not unusual for an adverse possession to begin under a mistake as
to the title .... ).
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enough time period so as to become the true owner via adverse
possession. It is conceivable, of course, that some squatters will have the
"conditional" or "provisional" intent to leave once the true owner
appears (although the true owner would seem to face inherent obstacles
in proving this in an actual case). The more likely result in a squatter
case under the Preble intent test, though, would seem to be that the
squatter wins.
Consider, however, the ridiculousness in applying this intent test in
a mistaken boundary case. Recall that a mistaken boundary claimant is a
claimant who has gone into possession of his neighbor's land based on a
pure, and honest, mistake about the location of the lot boundary.120
Under the Preble intent test, a court is supposed to inquire as to whether
that mistaken possessor had the intent to use adverse possession to claim
good title or whether the possessor's intent was "conditional" or
"provisional." This is a nonsensical inquiry. The Preble test, as applied
to a mistaken boundary case, requires an inquiry into the possessor's
state of mind about a question that the possessor would never have
considered. I am not the first to note the "Alice in Wonderland" nature
of the Preble test:
Indeed, it seems impossible to conceive the existence of an intention
upon the part of a [possessor] to claim title by possession of land not
covered by his deed when he has no knowledge or thought that his
possession may embrace land not conveyed by his deed, and has no
intention of encroaching on the rights of another; . .. [the] intent to
hold in case it should be found that the holding is wrongful could
not enter the mind unless or until some thought of possible error
121
had occurred.

C.

Understandingthe Impetus for the Abbott/Preble Intent Test

Why would the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine adopt the
Abbott/Preble intent test, when that test seems to require a ludicrous
inquiry? The prior decisions in Moody and Otis, I believe, are instructive
120. See suprap. 545.
121. Folkman v. Myers, 115 A. 615, 617 (N.J. 1921); see also Percy Bordwell, Disseisin and
Adverse Possession, 33 YALE L.J. 141, 153 (1923) ("This is in effect to require a conditional
intention to oust the true owner if a mistake shall appear. As such an intent is hardly likely to exist
where no mistake is dreamed of, and is hypothetical where the fact of mistake has been raised but
not settled, to make it material to the acquisition of title to property is merely to make a bad matter
worse."); Recent Case, 7 HARV. L. REV. 237, 242 (1893) ("This distinction [drawn in cases like
Preble] is too fine."); John Aycock McLendon, Jr., Note, Walls v. Grohman: Adverse Possession in
Mistaken Boundary Cases, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1496, 1503 (1986) ("Indeed, one problem with the
Preble rule is that it necessitates an inquiry into the possessor's intent under circumstances that
probably were never considered before the mistake was discovered.").
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as to what was motivating the court in Abbott and Preble: In short, the
Maine court had come to the conclusion that Brown was incorrectly
decided, and that a mistaken boundary should be able to ripen into a
successful adverse possession claim. The Preble intent test provided an
analytical route by which to achieve this desired result, even if this
analytical route was nonsensical in its actual application.
First, it is worth mentioning that there are legitimate reasons as to
why the Maine Supreme Judicial Court might have wanted to permit
adverse possession in mistaken boundary disputes. As mentioned earlier
in this Article, the normative argument against adverse possession in a
mistaken boundary case is definitely defensible.12 2 So too, however, is
the argument in favor of adverse possession in a mistaken boundary
case.123 It is not preposterous, then, to suppose that the Maine high court
had simply changed its mind as to whether adverse possession should
apply in the mistaken boundary context. 12 4 Given the holdings in Moody,
Otis, Abbott, and Preble, this conclusion seems justified.
If the Maine Supreme Judicial Court wanted to change direction
and allow adverse possession in mistaken boundary cases, why, then, did
the court not simply overrule the previous Brown decision? I believe two
122.
123.

See supra note 48.
This approach encourages true owners to be diligent in recognizing encroachments onto

their property. Allowing mistaken bou.idaries to ripen into adverse possession might have the effect
of encouraging communication and agreement between neighboring landowners, thus decreasing
litigation. Meier, supranote 2, at 62 n.26; Tucker, supra note 13, at 400-01. In short, believing that

adverse possession should apply in mistaken boundary cases is a logical, supportable position. Of
course, as briefly explained above in discussing the Brown case, believing that adverse possession
should not apply in a mistaken boundary case is also a reasonable position. See supra text

accompanying notes 50-57. Courts can legitimately come to different conclusions on this point.
124. Indeed, some of the factors that probably contributed to the court initially declining
adverse possession in mistaken boundary cases had changed in the time period between the Brown
decision and the Preble decision. For one, the art of surveying and thus determining the true

boundary between legal lots had undoubtedly improved in the time period between Brown and
Preble. In reading many of the early Maine cases, one is struck by the extreme difficulty in

determining the true legal boundaries established by often rudimentary parcel descriptions. See, e.g.,
Otis v. Moulton, 20 Me. 205, 207-09 (1841); Moody v. Nichols, 16 Me. 23, 25-26 (1839); Brown v.
Gay, 3 Me. 126, 128-30 (1824). Recognizing adverse possession when there is so little clarity
regarding true lot lines might have threatened the effort to create clearly defined legal parcels. As
the exercise of describing and surveying land improved, however, and as this objective of clearly

defined lot lines became more of a reality, the concept of adverse possession in mistaken boundary
cases might have represented less of a threat. Moreover, as absentee ownership became less

prevalent, and as land usage intensified, the calculus regarding who was in the best position to avoid
these disputes might have changed. When the possessor is encroaching on an absentee landowner's
land, the encroacher is in the best position to avoid the mistake, and thus, it makes sense to reject
adverse possession so as not to reward the possessor from having made this mistake. On the other
hand, when the true owner being encroached upon is present rather than absentee, he or she is in a

better position to prevent the loss, thus justifying the application of adverse possession when the
true owner does not take the affirmative step to ascertain, and remove, the encroacher.
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factors pushed the court to adopt the Preble intent test rather than to
directly overrule Brown.
First, the court was probably disinterested in directly overruling its
prior precedent. Supreme courts tend to take stare decisis very
seriously.' 2 5 In the previous cases of Moody and Otis, the Maine high
court had distinguished Brown so as to permit a mistaken boundary
claimant to win.126 The Preble intent test allowed the court to continue
down this same road of delicately undermining Brown without having to
expressly overrule the decision.
Second, the court was likely concerned as to what effect overruling
Brown would have on other types of adverse possession cases. In
particular, the court might have been concerned that recognizing the
adverse possession claim of a mistaken boundary claimant would
preclude the adverse possession claim of a squatter. As explained
previously, Maine appeared to be firmly committed to allowing pure
squatters to win an adverse possession claim.12 7

To demonstrate this point, recall the various results in the different
types of adverse possession cases under the three different knowledgebased tests:
TABLE 5
Type

Result Under
Objective
Approach

Result Under
Good Faith
Approach

Result Under
Bad Faith
Approach

Color of Title
Squatter
Mistaken Boundary

Win
Win
Win

Win
Lose
Win

Lose
Win
Lose

When Maine adhered to the position that mistaken boundary claimants
should lose while squatters should win, the bad faith approach worked to
get the "right" result in both of those cases.1 28
In moving to the view that mistaken boundary claimants should
win, however, the Maine court was in an analytical dilemma with regard

125.

Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) ("[Adherence to] [s]tare decisis is 'the

preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of

legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process."' (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991))).
126. Otis, 20 Me. at 211-12; Moody, 16 Me. at 25-26.
127.

See supra text accompanying notes 62-68.

128.

Of course, this bad faith approach got the "wrong" result in the color of title case, but

Maine cases had long held that the color of title fact situation could give rise to an adverse
possession claim. See supra note 59.
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to the result it also desired in the squatter case. If the court were to
overrule Brown and adopt a good faith approach to mistaken boundary
cases, this same approach in a squatter case would mean that the squatter
would lose. 12 9
Of course, the Maine court could have determined that the mistaken
boundary and squatter cases were governed by two different knowledgebased standards. Thus, the Maine court could have held that a good faith
approach would be used in mistaken boundary cases while a bad faith
approach would be used in squatter cases. Recall that this was the
approach used by the New York court in Van Valkenburgh.'30 Recall
also, however, the criticism that has been directed towards the court's
analysis in Van Valkenburgh.'31
The Maine court also could have reached its desired result in both
the squatter and mistaken boundary cases by simply adopting an
objective view, and thus completely eliminating the inquiry into the
claimant's state of mind. Under an objective approach, of course,
adverse possession is available in every type of case.' 32 This approach,
however, would have been a dramatic departure from previous case law.
Maine case law had consistently used the state of mind of the possessor
as part of its adverse possession analysis.133 Similar to how the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine seemed reluctant to directly overrule Brown, I
imagine the court was also very hesitant to abruptly turn its back on its
traditional inquiry into the possessor's state of mind.
Instead of pursuing any of the above-described routes, the court in
Abbott and Preble adopted an approach that continued the Maine
tradition of analyzing the state of mind of the possessor. 13 4 Indeed, one
can view Abbott and Preble as "doubling down" on the state of mind
inquiry. Rather than adopting the objective approach thus eliminating the
state of mind inquiry, the court added intent into the state of mind
analysis. Adding the intent analysis allowed the court to continue to
examine a possessor's state of mind while also permitting adverse

129. See supra Table 5.
130. In Van Valkenburgh, the court wanted both the squatter and mistaken boundary claimant
to lose, so it employed a good faith approach in the squatter situation and a bad faith approach in the
mistaken boundary situation. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text. The Maine court
wanted the adverse possessor to win both of these types of cases, so it would have applied the good
faith approach to the mistaken boundary case and the bad faith approach to the squatter case.
131. See supranote 40.
132. This approach would have had the additional benefit of allowing recovery in the color of
title context.
133. See supraPart UL.A-B.

134. Preble v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 27 A. 149, 150 (Me. 1893); Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Me. 575,
584 (1863).
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possession in both the squatter and mistaken boundary contexts. The
intent analysis of Abbott and Preble allowed the court to thread the
proverbial needle: the court got the result it wanted for both squatter and
mistaken boundary cases without having to (1) directly overrule Brown;
(2) use two different tests for different types of cases (as the New York
court later did in Van Valkenburgh); or (3) eliminate the inquiry into the
possessor's state of mind that Maine had long employed.
The previous Maine case law gave the court just enough wiggle
room to take the route it took in Abbott and Preble. The 1850 decision in
Lincoln, discussed above, introduced the "claim of title" concept and
suggested that intent, rather than mistake, was the determinative
factor.' 35 Even before Lincoln, however, the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court had occasionally described the Brown rule precluding adverse
possession in a mistaken boundary case in terms of the intent of the
possessor rather than the mistake regarding true ownership. In the 1828
case of Ross v. Gouldl36 the court stated that "[a] disseisin cannot be
committed by mistake because the intention of the possessor to claim
adversely is an essential ingredient."l3 7 Notice the manner in which the
Ross Court describes the Brown rule. In Brown, the court stated that an
adverse possession claim that is "plainly founded in mistake" cannot
succeed.138 This articulation of the rule suggests that it is the possessor's
belief that he is the true owner that serves to preclude the claim; the
owner has good faith, but bad faith is required. In Ross, however, the
court suggests that the intent to assert an adverse possession claim is the
real test. The mistake by the possessor in thinking that he is the true
owner does not strictly preclude the possessor from winning as a legal
matter, but the mistake has this practical effect because a possessor who
is mistaken will not have the necessary intent required under the
governing legal standard."3
This shift suggested in Ross, from a focus on the possessor's belief
regarding true ownership to a focus on the possessor's intent to assert an
adverse possession claim, is irrelevant as long as it is recognized that
these two states of mind go hand-in-hand. A mistaken boundary
claimant who believes that he is the true owner of the land in question
will not have the intent to assert an adverse possession claim.140

135. See supra text accompanying notes 101-09.
136. 5 Me. 204 (1828).
137. Id. at 212 (citing Brown v. Gay, 3 Me. 126, 130-31 (1824)).
138. Brown, 3 Me. at 130-31.
139. Preble,27 A. at 150.
140. See William Sternberg, The Element of Hostility in Adverse Possession, 6 TEMP. L.Q.
207, 213-14 (1932) (describing the "Early Maine Rule" as resting on the presumption that "as long
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Conversely, a squatter who knows that he is not the true owner of the
land will almost always have the intent to assert an adverse possession
claim.14 1 Thus, as comprehended in prior cases such as Ross, whether the
determinative test is based on belief about true ownership or intent to
claim adverse possession, the result is the same and it makes no
difference whether the claimant loses because of his good faith belief
that he owned the land in question or his failure to intend to claim
adverse possession. Under either the belief test or the intent test, the
analysis will result in a mistaken boundary claimant losing and a
squatter winning.14 2 in order to reach the result that a mistaken boundary
claimant could win, however, and to avoid overruling Brown, and to
preserve the rule that a squatter could win an adverse possession claim,
the courts in Abbott and Preble simply indulged in the fantasy that a
mistaken boundary claimant could nevertheless have the intent to claim
adverse possession.
By doing so, the court provided an analytical path such that a
mistaken boundary claimant could win. Of course, a successful adverse
possession claim was not necessarily guaranteedunder the Preble intent
test, as it would have been if the Maine court had simply adopted the
objective or good faith versions of the knowledge-based approach.
Instead, it was now up to the jury, instructed according to Abbott and
Preble to apply this nonsensical standard. The failure to give these
instructions constituted reversible error, as occurred in Abbott.143 So long
as these instructions were given to the fact finder, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine would usually allow the verdict to stand, regardless of
whether the verdict was in favor of the adverse possessor'" or the true
owner. 145 In a few early cases, claimants made the mistake of
specifically admitting that they never intended to claim anything other
than the true boundary line, and thus suffered an adverse judgment as a
matter of law.1 46 In later cases, though, the mistaken boundary claimants
became savvier in describing their "intent" about a question that they

as [the adverse claimant] believes himself to be the true owner, he will never have the intention to
hold in hostility to the true owner").

141.

See Preble, 27 A. 150-51; Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Me. 575, 584 (1863).

142.

See supra Figure 2.

143. Abbott, 51 Me. at 585.
144. See, e.g., Hitchings v. Morrison, 72 Me. 331, 333-34 (1881) (upholding jury verdict for
adverse possessor in mistaken boundary case).

145. See, e.g., Crosby v. Baizley, 642 A.2d 150, 154 (Me. 1994) (upholding jury verdict for
true owner in adverse possession claim based on mistaken boundary).

146. See, e.g., Landry v. Giguere, 143 A. 1, 2-3 (Me. 1928) (deciding admission from mistaken
boundary claimant that he did not intend to claim anything other than the true lot required a
judgment for true owner as a matter of law); Borneman v. Milliken, 100 A. 5, 7 (Me. 1917) (same).
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had never actually considered during their possession. 14 7 Recall that one
of the objections to the Maine Rule is that it encourages claimants to
lie.148 This criticism misses the mark. A lawyer did not really need his
claimant to lie to win a mistaken boundary case under the Maine Rule;
the lawyer just needed to convince his client that, if he had known this
was not his property, he would have had the requisite intent to assert an
adverse possession claim. It is difficult to truly lie about such an
amorphous, fanciful question.
IV.

LESSONS FROM THE MAINE RULE

There are important lessons-with contemporary value-to be
learned from the history behind the Maine Rule.
First, it should now be obvious to the reader that an inquiry into a
possessor's intent is unnecessary within adverse possession doctrine,
even though some jurisdictions still engage in this analysis. 149
The jurisdictions that still employ an intent-based approach seem to
operate on a different assumption than that of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine. Recall that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
introduced the intent-based approach as an analytical method by which
mistaken boundary claimants could win an adverse possession claim.so
In order for this to work, the Maine court assumed that even good faith
possessors could have the required "intent to dispossess." For
jurisdictions that still employ an intent-based inquiry, however, the
assumption seems to be that a claimant will only have the necessary
"intent to dispossess" if the claimant is aware that he is possessing land
owned by someone else."' In other words, it is assumed that only badfaith squatters will have the required intent. This assumption makes
practical sense, and avoids the fantasy indulged in by Maine courts. But,
if it is assumed that only bad faith squatters can have the requisite intent,
the intent test is really just another way of articulating the knowledge147. In a reversal of the earlier cases in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine would
occasionally enter judgment as a matter of law for the true owner, in some later cases the court
would enter judgment as a matter of law for the possessor. McMullen v. Dowley, 483 A.2d 698, 701
(Me. 1984) (determining that the possessor's testimony that the true owner "would have to go to
court [to] prove [ownership]" established the necessary intent to claim adverse possession, such that
judgment was entered in favor of the possessor as a matter of law).
148. See supranotes 14-15 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Fulkerson v. Van Buren, 961 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]he
church congregation did not possess the land with the requisite intent for seven years .....
150. See supratext accompanying notes 8-10.
151. See, e.g., Fulkerson, 961 S.W.2d at 782 (presuming that a good faith claimant cannot have
the requisite intent); see Perry v. Heirs of Gadsden, 449 S.E.2d 250, 251 (S.C. 1994) (per curiam);
Ellis v. Jansing, 620 S.W.2d 569, 571-72 (Tex. 1981).
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based bad faith approach, at least in the mistaken boundary context.152
As such, the intent test serves no analytical function that could not be
achieved by the bad faith test. Thus, a jurisdiction can achieve the
objective of preventing adverse possession in a mistaken boundary case
by pointing to the claimant's lack of bad faith or lack of intent to
possess. If it is assumed that the required intent can only arise in a bad
faith possessor, the result is the same either way. For this reason, in
those jurisdictions-like Texas-that purport to look at the intent of the
possessor as a reason for denying adverse possession, this conclusion is
often stated as an application of the bad faith knowledge-based
approach.153 This is a concession that the intent test is one-and-the-same
as the bad faith approach. The intent test, then, has no analytical
significance apart from the bad faith approach, and could be eliminated
as a separate inquiry with no practical difference.
No jurisdiction appears to continue the fantasy upon which the
Maine Rule was predicated-that a good faith claimant could
nevertheless have the requisite intent to dispossess. In any event, there
are easier ways to allow a good faith claimant (in a mistaken boundary
or color of title situation) to win her claim. Namely, a jurisdiction could
employ either the good faith or objective approach to reach this result.
Here again, then, the intent inquiry is unnecessary to any result that a
jurisdiction wishes to reach.
The history of the Maine Rule also reveals deeper insights about
adverse possession law in general. The Maine Rule nicely demonstrates
the challenges that can arise when courts focus on a claimant's state of
mind as a reason for either denying-or allowing-an adverse
possession claim. Recall that the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
adopted its intent-based approach because it felt boxed in by what it had
previously held regarding a claimant's state of mind and the different
types of adverse possession cases.154 The result was the Maine Rule,
which provided an analytical escape from this "trap." The analytical
"escape" provided for under the Maine Rule, however, was based on the
nonsensical idea that a party could have an "intent to dispossess" land
they thought they already owned."' Stepping back, then, it is apparent
that Maine's initial inquiry into a claimant's state of mind started the

152. It is conceivable that a jurisdiction might want to allow a squatter to win only if they have
the intent to possess. In almost all instances, however, it would seem that a squatter would have this
intent.
153. See, e.g., Hardee, supra note 2, at 572, 581-82 (describing the Texas approach as a bad
faith hostile intent standard).
154. See supratext accompanying note 45.
155. See supratext accompanying notes 71-72.
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Maine court on a path that eventually led to the creation of an entirely
ridiculous test.
Although the Maine Rule is a great example of what can occur
when a court uses a claimant's state of mind as part of the adverse
possession inquiry, it is not the only example. There is no shortage of
instances in which commentators, judges, and litigators have struggled
with the question of what the law requires regarding a possessor's state
of mind. 15 6
The underlying problem with any inquiry into a claimant's state of
mind (either knowledge or intent) is, I believe, a failure to appreciate
that a uniform approach to the state of mind question might not produce
results that a court finds satisfactory for all different types of adverse
possession cases. Thus, the "intent to dispossess" approach or bad faith
approach might allow a court to reject adverse possession in a mistaken
boundary case, but it would require the court to also reject adverse
possession in a color of title case. A court that wanted to avoid this result
in the color of title case could inject a more nuanced state of mind
inquiry, as occurred under the Maine Rule. Or, the court could just use
two different approaches to the required state of mind for each type of
case; this is what occurred in Van Valkenburgh.'" Either way, though,
confusion is likely to ensue.
Completely eliminating the inquiry into a possessor's state of mind
would solve this problem. But I am skeptical that courts will ever follow
this path, for reasons that I have explained previously.' Assuming that
courts are still going to use a claimant's state of mind as part of an
adverse possession inquiry, then, it is imperative that this be done with
precision and awareness. Namely, a court that wants to use a claimant's
state of mind as a justification for a result in one type of case must
accept that a different justification might be needed to reach the desired
result in a different type of case. With the state of mind inquiry in
adverse possession, one size simply does not fit all. Without this
recognition, confusion and-as in the case of the Maine Rule-fantasy
will frequently arise.
Maine's effort to statutorily overrule the Maine Rule is perhaps the
best cautionary tale as to the need for precision and awareness when
dealing with a state of mind inquiry within adverse possession law. In
1999, the Maine legislature undertook an effort to overrule the Maine

156. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
158. See generally Meier, supra note 2 (explaining the inclination of courts to explain results
by reference to rules).
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Rule by statute.' 5 9 The Maine legislature clearly approved of the result
that the Maine courts had reached in permitting mistaken boundary
claimants to win adverse possession. But, the legislature obviously
disapproved of the manner in which this result had to occur under the
Maine Rule; the Maine legislature wanted to end the fantasy that
required a mistaken boundary claimant to testify as to whether they had
the "intent to dispossess."
Towards this goal, the Maine legislature adopted the following
statutory provision:
If a person takes possession of land by mistake as to the location of the
true boundary line and possession of the land in dispute is open and
notorious, under claim of right, and continuous for the statutory period,
the hostile nature of the claim is established and no further evidence of
160
the knowledge or intention of the person in possession is required.
The objective of the legislature in passing this statute seems clear
enough: mistaken boundary claimants should be able to establish
adverse possession in Maine without having to show the "intent to
dispossess." A statement of fact accompanying the bill confirmed this
legislative objective.16' And the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
eventually confirmed this result, stating as follows: "[W]e hold that the
62
intent requirement for adverse possession claims is eliminated."l
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the Maine court
reprimanded the legislature in expressing this result in terms of the
"hostile" requirement of adverse possession law rather than the "claim of
right" requirement. According to the Maine court, the "hostile" element
refers to the requirement that the possession be without the owner's
permission,163 while the intent analysis required under Maine law fell
under the "claim of right" element. 16

159. Dombkowski v. Ferland, 893 A.2d 599, 605 (Me. 2006) ("[T]he statement of fact
accompanying the bill explicitly states that the Legislature intended to eliminate the intent
requirement for adverse possession claims.").
160. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 810-A (1993).
161. Dombkowski, 893 A.2d at 605.
162. Id. Curiously, although the Maine statute addresses only cases involving a "mistake as to
the location of the true boundary line," the Dombkowski Court did not include this limitation in
pronouncing that "the intent requirement for adverse possession claims is eliminated." Id.
163. In almost every other jurisdiction, the concept that the true owner's permission destroys a
claim for adverse possession is associated with the "adverse" element. Thus, the Maine court, in
reprimanding the Maine legislature, was using terminology that was inconsistent with the
terminology employed in most other jurisdictions. Moreover, it is arguable that the Maine
legislature had correctly used the terms as they had been previously defined by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine.
164. Dombkowski, 893 A.2d at 602.
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The inability of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court to resist the
temptation to enter the minefield of adverse possession terminology1 6 5
apparently raised the dander of the Maine legislature. Despite getting
the exact result that the Maine legislature had desired-the Maine
court had, after all, acknowledged that the effect of the statute was to
eliminate the intent requirement in a mistaken boundary casel 66-the
Maine legislature could not leave well enough alone. Thus, the Maine
legislature amended the statute to respond to the public reprimand
it had received by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine regarding proper
terminology. The amended statute now reads as follows: "If a person
takes possession of land by mistake as to the location of the true
boundary, the possessor's mistaken belief does not defeat a claim of
adverse possession."167

This amended statute avoids any adverse possession terminology at
all. Arguably, however, it undermines the very objective that motivated
the legislature to act in the first place: this statute would not appear to
overrule the Maine Rule.
Recall that the Maine Rule was adopted so as to provide an
analytical route by which a mistaken boundary claimant could perfect an
adverse possession claim.' 6 ' This was accomplished by the introduction
of the intent analysis. The (fantastical) assumption that formed the basis
of the Maine Rule was that a mistaken boundary claimant could
nevertheless have the required "intent to dispossess."
Notice, however, that the amended version of the Maine statute
simply confirms that result. Under the Maine Rule, a "possessor's
mistaken belief does not defeat a claim of adverse possession," which is
exactly what the statute now says.16' Rather than overrule the Maine
Rule, the amended version of the Maine statute seems to reaffirm the
Maine Rule! 1 70 What a mess!"'
165. I hope it is now apparent to the reader as to why I have avoided any mention of adverse
possession elements or terms in this Article. See supranote 22. The concepts involved are difficult
enough, without having to first resolve what "element" or "term" with which the concept should be
associated. Cf LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR 162 (Rush Rhees ed., Anthony
Kenny trans., 1974) ("Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to
be found in the grammar of the language.").
166. Actually, the court suggested that the intent requirement was eliminated for all cases.

Dombkowski, 893 A.2d at 605 ("[W]e hold that the intent requirement for adverse possession claims
is eliminated.").

§ 810-A

167.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,

168.

See supratext accompanying note 69.

(2015).

169.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,§ 810-A.

170.

Most commentators have assumed that the amended statute continues to abrogate the

Maine Rule. See, e.g., Sipe, supra note 2, at 859 n.17 ("The [Maine] rule has since been eliminated
in Maine itself, via ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 810-A (2009) ... .").
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The contemporary confusion still existing about the Maine Rule
underscores that the Maine Rule is not a problem relegated to history.
Indeed, the very conditions that led to the mess that is Maine law are
present in every jurisdiction. Namely, courts react to different types of
adverse possession cases with different instincts as to how that type of
case should be resolved.1 72 Courts should be extremely carefully in using
a claimant's state of mind to reach these desired results. Havoc awaits
for those jurisdictions that ignore the lessons from the history of the
Maine Rule.

171.

Although unrelated to the point being made in this Article, the Maine Supreme Judicial

Court's decision in Northland Realty, LLC v. Crawford, 953 A.2d 359 (Me. 2008), adds an
additional layer of intrigue to this saga. In NorthlandRealty, the court stated the following:

Possessing land under a claim of right means the claimant is in possession as owner,
with intent to claim the land as one's own, and not in recognition of or subordination to

the record title holder. An individual possesses land under a "claim of right," even
though the individual acknowledges that he or she does not have record title, as long as
the possession is with the intent to claim the land as one's own.
Id. at 365 (citation omitted). This seems to directly contradict the court's statement in Dombkowski
that "the intent requirement for adverse possession claims is eliminated." Dombkowski, 893 A.2d at

605. There is no reconciliation of these two statements in Northland Realty, despite the fact
Dombkowski is cited previously in the NorthlandRealty opinion for the proposition that "[a]dverse
possession presents a mixed question of law and fact." Northland Realty, 953 A.2d at 364 (quoting
Dombkowski, 893 A.2d at 606). Moreover, the NorthlandRealty litigants cited Dombkowski in their
brief to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Brief of Appellees at 13-14, NorthlandRealty, LLC,
953 A.2d 359 (No. CUM-07-714). And, to top it off, the Northland Realty case was decided in
2008-before the amendments to the Maine legislation in 2015; thus, Northland Realty cannot be
understood as a reaction to these confusing legislative amendments.

The NorthlandRealty Court's failure to reconcile its reaffirmation of the intent analysis,
while failing to acknowledge the direct statement to the contrary in Dombkowski, can be reconciled
by noting that the Maine legislation speaks only to mistaken boundary cases, while Northland
Realty did not involve a mistaken boundary case. Even if this was the distinction that the court was

making in Northland Realty, it is surprising that this was not explained in detail, given the
unqualified language in Dombkowski that seems to completely eliminate the intent analysis for all
adverse possession cases. There is some irony to this situation: the failure to clearly distinguish
between different types of adverse possession cases is part of what got Maine into the mess it is
currently in. The NorthlandRealty decision might indicate that this hard lesson has yet to have been
learned.

172. See, e.g., Horton v. McLerkin, 275 S.W.2d 10, 11-12 (Ark. 1955); Greathouse v. Linger,
127 S.E. 31, 32 (W. Va. 1925).
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